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Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power∗
Abstract
This article analyzes a simple two-period model where two homogenous manufacturers
compete to supply a monopolist retailer. We show that, if manufacturers are vulnerable,
i.e if they are likely to exit the market in case of insufficient orders in the first period,
they may exploit their threat of exit to capture the whole first period industry profit. In-
deed, the retailer will accept to pay the high price to the manufacturers in order to secure
upstream competition in the second period. Results are robust under different market
structures or contract types.
JEL Classifications: L14, L12, D21, Q12.
Keywords: Bargaining power, market entry, vertical contract.
∗We thank Roman Inderst, Patrick Rey, Thibaud Vergé, and seminars participants at EARIE 2005 and EEA
2006. The title of a previous version of this article was: 'The Reciprocal Producer's Incentives to Prey and
Retailer's Buyer Power'
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1 Introduction
The industrial organization literature has recently devoted a great deal of interest to the analysis
of the determinants of bargaining power in vertical relationships. Bargaining power deals with
firms' capacity to capture the surplus created by a transaction within the vertical structure.
Dobson & Waterson (1999) and Allain (2002) show that the determinants of such a balance of
power between producers and retailers seems to be inversely correlated with the relative degree
of imperfect competition at the considered level. More competition downstream translates thus
into more bargaining power upstream. Other sources of bargaining power have been recently
highlighted, such as retailer's size associated with buyer power in Inderst and Wey (2007) or
producer's differentiation in Chambolle and Villas-Boas (2007). For a recent and wider survey
on the buyer power and its determinants, see Inderst and Mazzarotto (2006).
In this article, we show that the threat of exit may be used as a particular weapon in the
negotiation between producers and retailers. This article reveals that producers who are highly
dependent from a retailer (in the sense that a temporary breach in their contract with the
retailer may credibly induce their exit out of the market) may turn this apparent weakness
into a strategy resulting in an increase of their profits. A buyer may indeed accept higher
wholesale prices from its suppliers in order to preserve future upstream competition, and thus
future profits. We characterize pure strategy Nash equilibria where producers increase their
bargaining power by neutralizing upstream competition. They are able to capture the whole
surplus created by their transaction with the retailer, exploiting the buyer's dependance on
future competition that may be jeopardized by the threat of manufacturers' exit, and increasing
therefore their bargaining power. Financial constraints have a key role to explain why these
equilibria are sustainable.
Related results can be found in the procurement literature devoted to single vs dual sourcing
in buyer's strategy where a principal faces two agents for supply. In a learning by doing context
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where sellers' production cost decreases with the quantity produced at each period, Lewis and
Yildirim (2002) exhibit equilibria where the buyer orders alternatively from different sellers to
maintain future market rivalry rather than buying exclusively from one manufacturer at a lower
cost. Biglaiser and Vettas (2004) develop a model based on a different assumption: a capacity
constrained producer disappears once he sold its entire production. They however fail to find
pure strategy equilibria, but they show that a buyer may split his orders to preserve future
competition on the market. Repeated interactions between manufacturers and retailers may
therefore change the classic one shot outcome where only the efficient manufacturer is active.
We first develop a simple model that confirms our main argument: a retailer may loose
buyer power in a dynamic framework of repeated contract because of his will to maintain
future upstream competition. We then relax some assumptions on contract types or market
structure and show that the mechanism still hold, giving thus robustness to our result.
2 The Model
Two upstream manufacturersM1 andM2 compete for the production of a homogenous prod-
uct. A downstream monopolist retailer R carries the product and resells it to final consumers.
Consumers demand at most two units of the good per period, and their willingness to pay per
unit is normalized to 1. Each manufacturer can produce at most two units of the good per
period. While M1 has a zero unit cost, M2 is assumed to be less efficient than M1 with a unit
cost c ∈ [0, 1].
We add the three following assumptions:
A1: If no unit is bought to a manufacturer for one period, he exits the market at the
end of this period.
A2: Manufacturers have a discount factor δm whereas the retailer has a discount factor
δr. Besides, δm < δr.
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A3: There is no entry on the upstream market.
Assumptions A1 and A2 translate manufacturers' structural and financial vulnerability. If
a manufacturer receives an insufficient order in t = 1, he won't be active in t = 2 (sales
objectives).1 We assume a lower discount factor for manufacturers relatively to the retailer since
present profits are more important for a vulnerable firm. Besides, this assumption translates the
fact that a bank will not offer the same credit conditions to a powerful retailer or to vulnerable
manufacturers (risky investment).2
We consider a two-period game where t = {1, 2} denotes the period. The timing for each
period is the following. At stage 1,M1 andM2make simultaneously take-it or leave-it wholesale
price offers to the retailer, respectively denoted wt1 and w
t
2.
3 At stage 2, the retailer decides his
supply strategy, i.e. he can either buy exclusively fromM1 or fromM2, or he can purchase one
unit to each of them. At stage 3, the retailer sets the final price and resells the units bought to
consumers.
In a one-shot game, the classic equilibrium is the Bertrand solution. Manufacturers offers
are w1 = c − ε, w2 = c and the retailer buys only from M1. Profits are: ΠM1 = 2c, ΠM2 = 0
and ΠR = 2 (1− c). Price competition leads the efficient manufacturer to be the exclusive
supplier with strictly positive profits because of his competitive advantage. The retailer also
gets positive profits thanks to upstream competition and social welfare is maximal since the
two units are produced by the most efficient manufacturer: SW = 2.
1The firm can need to meet profit hurdles to remain on the market in the future, as argued in Biglaiser and
DeGraba (2001) or Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
2For a model of firms' financing through imperfect capital market, see Holström and Tirole (1997). They
show why risky investments, in presence of moral hazard, are less likely to be financed for firms with low assets.
3We assume that producers and retailer are unable to commit to any long term contract because of the
uncertain presence of manufacturers at the second period. Note that we also exclude all other types of transfer
(transfers not based on sales) between the retailer and the manufacturers.
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3 The Two-period Game Equilibria
In a two-period game, the possibility for one manufacturer to exit the market at the end of
period 1 if he didn't sell one unit to the retailer generates new equilibria. We solve the game
backward to find the Nash subgame equilibria.
3.1 Subgame equilibria in t = 2
There are three subgame equilibria depending on the supply strategy the retailer decided in
t = 1. If R chose to buy 2 units to M1 (resp. M2) in t = 1, M2 (resp.M1) is no more active in
t = 2. Therefore in t = 2, M1 (resp. M2) offers a monopolist contract w21 = 1 (resp. w
2
2 = 1)
to R, who accepts. R sets then the final price at p2 = 1 and resells both units to consumers.
Profits are thus: Π2M1 = 2δ
m (resp. Π2M2 = 2δ
m(1− c)), while R gets zero profit.
If R chose to buy one unit to each manufacturer, both M1 and M2 are still on the market
in t = 2. Therefore, upstream competition in t = 2 leads to the one-shot game equilibrium and
profits are: Π2M1 = 2δ
mc, Π2M2 = 0 and Π
2
R = 2δ
r(1− c).
3.2 Equilibria in t = 1
In t = 1, each manufacturer has the choice between an "Exclusion" (E) wholesale price to get
the exclusive supply towards the retailer, or an "Accommodation" (A) strategy with his rival.
Superscripts on variables denotes the chosen strategy.
First, a manufacturer adopts an exclusion strategy if he sets a sufficiently low wholesale
price to convince the retailer to choose him as an exclusive supplier, renouncing to the benefits
of upstream competition in t = 2. We determine, for each manufacturer, the highest wholesale
price which given his rival's price enables him to get the supply exclusivity in t = 1.
Lemma 1 M1's predation strategy for exclusivity is w1E1 = max {w12 − 2δr (1− c) ,−δm}. M2's
exclusion strategy is w1E2 = max {w11 − 2δr (1− c) , c− δm(1− c)}.
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In order to get the exclusivity, each manufacturer must offer a first period wholesale price
low enough to compensate the retailer for the absence of upstream competition in the second
period: the foregone retailer's profit is pi2R = 2δ
r (1− c). Moreover, both manufacturers and
the retailer have to realize non negative profits over the two periods: therefore w1E1 > −δm and
w1E2 > c− δm(1− c).
A manufacturer who chooses an accommodation strategy can afford to set a higher price
than his rival. Indeed, manufacturers know that the retailer is reluctant to renounce to the
benefits of upstream competition in t = 2. In other words, manufacturers anticipate the retailer
will be strongly disposed to buy one unit to each of them, and they thus seek to exploit such
behavior. We determine, for each manufacturer, the highest acceptable wholesale price given
the rival offer to supply one unit in t = 1 to the retailer.
Lemma 2 M1's accommodation strategy is w1A1 = max {min {w12 + 2δr(1− c), 2 + 2δr(1− c)− w12} ; 0}.
M2's accommodation strategy is w1A2 = max {min {w11 + 2δr(1− c); 2 + 2δr(1− c)− w11} ; c}.
The retailer's financial constraint is taken into account by manufacturers who anticipate that
the sum of their first-period wholesale prices must not exceed the total revenues the retailer
then gets over the two periods: w1A1 + w
1A
2 ≤ 2 + 2δr(1− c). When the retailer's financial
constraint is not binding, the accommodation wholesale price strictly increases with his rival
price. Since each manufacturer anticipates that the retailer is ready to pay a premium to keep
him active in the next period, it enables manufacturers to raise their price and thus relax
upstream competition.
Let γ be such that δr = γδm. It results from A2 that γ > 1. The analysis of each
manufacturer's incentive to deviate unilaterally from an "Accommodation" to a "Exclusion"
strategy leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For δ˜ = 2−c
2(1−c)(3γ−2) and δ
∗ = c
2(1−c)(3γ−1) , there exists two types of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies :
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(i) If δ˜ < δm < 1, there is a continuum of Nash equilibria accommodation defined by
the following conditions: w1A2 ∈
[
1
3
(4− c+ 2δm (1− c)) , 2
3
(1 + (3γ − 1) δm (1− c))] and
w1A1 + w
1A
2 = 2 + 2δ
r(1− c). R buys one unit to each supplier in t = 1, and only to M1
at price w21 = c in t = 2;
(ii) If δ∗ < δm ≤ δ˜, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
(iii) If 0 ≤ δm ≤ δ∗, the only Nash equilibrium (exclusivity) is such that w1E1 = c− 2δr (1− c),
w1E2 = c, R buys 2 units to M1 (exclusivity) in t = 1. R then buys 2 units at price w
2E
1 = 1
in t = 2;
Proof. See Appendix.
The only exclusion equilibrium (iii) is such that M1 gets the supply exclusivity since M2
is less efficient. The predatory wholesale price for M1 depends on the level of the premium he
must pay to the retailer in comparison with M2's marginal cost c. This premium increases in
δr (and in δm), since R grants more value to the second period profits. On the contrary, the
premium decreases with c: When M2 is less efficient, he is not a very interesting leverage for R
in t = 2 (when c increases, R's second period profit when both producers compete decreases).
The exclusion equilibrium is thus sustainable for low values of the discount factors and the
upper threshold δ∗ increases with c.
For intermediate values of δm or δr (ii), as it becomes more costly for M1 to prey his rival
in t = 1, M1 has an incentive to switch for an accommodation strategy. However, the accom-
modation profits expected by M2 in t = 1 are not high enough and M2 has now an incentive
to exclude M1 rather than to accommodate. Finally, there is no Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies.
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When δm > δ˜ (i),the expected accommodation profit is high while the premium to pay to
get the exclusivity is too expensive: there is an accommodation strategy equilibrium where M1
and M2 can extract all the rent from their relationship with R in t = 1 by setting w1A1 +w
1A
2 =
2 + 2δr (1− c). With such a strategy, manufacturers clearly increase their bargaining power
towards the retailer compared to the one-shot game outcome. However, another condition is
required to insure the existence of accommodation equilibria:
Corollary 1 The range of δm in which accommodation equilibria arise is non-empty only if
γ > 4(1−c)
4−5c for c <
4
5
.
Proof. The above condition just states that γδ˜ ≤ 1.
Retailer's and manufacturers' financial constraints (positive profit on both periods) have a
key role to explain why accommodation equilibria can hold. Notice first that retailer's financial
constraint define an upper bound for manufacturers' rents extraction which is an important
condition of existence for the accommodation equilibrium. Without the retailer's financial con-
straint, each manufacturer would always have an incentive to overbid his rival's offer in the
accommodation strategy. Second, from Corollary 1 accommodation equilibria exist only if re-
tailer's discount factor is sufficiently greater than the manufacturers' discount factor.4 Indeed,
if all firms have the same discount factor, from an accommodation situation where manufac-
turers saturate retailer's financial constraint in t = 1, each firm would have an incentive to
underbid his rival's offer in order to obtain the exclusivity. The insight is as follows. Assume
that δr = δm (i.e γ = 1), when the discount factor increases, the expected gain from the ac-
commodation strategy relatively to the exclusion strategy for manufacturers rises in t = 1 but
the future loss from this accommodation strategy also rises in t = 2. At the end, a rise in δ
gives no advantage to the accommodation strategy towards the exclusion strategy, and there
is no accommodation Nash equilibrium in pure strategy. If now δr = γδm, an increase in γ
4Note that this condition is not required in the linear demand case developed in extension.
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improves the relative profitability of the accommodation strategy in t = 1 without changing
his relative expected loss in t = 2 since only the first period profits depend on δr. Thus, if
γ is strong enough, manufacturers do not have any incentive to underbid his rival offer and
accommodation equilibria in pure strategy are sustainable. Without the above two conditions,
there would not therefore exist any pure Nash equilibrium but only mixed strategy equilibria
would arise, like in Biglaiser and Vettas (2004).
Finally, our main conclusions are that:
(1) If producers' dependency towards a retailer is such that they can credibly threaten the
latter to exit the market in case of a temporary breach in their relationships, this threat
can be a source of bargaining power for manufacturers;
(2) Such a source of bargaining power is strong enough to enable manufacturers to annihilate
entirely upstream competition.
An interesting parallel can be made with the results of Lewis and Yildirim (2002) in a
learning-by-doing framework where no supply means a higher marginal cost for future periods
(and not exit of the market). They qualitatively find the same result: a sole buyer maintains
an inefficient supplier for future competition by splitting orders (mixed strategy equilibria).
They do not however find that the manufacturers exploit the buyer's dependence through high
wholesale transfers. Their result relies on the information asymmetry assumption. Because
each manufacturer ignores the marginal cost of his rival, he cannot anticipate how much the
retailer is willing to pay in order to preserve future competition. When costs are known, exclu-
sive supply is much more likely.
Note that even if c = 0, no accommodation equilibrium exists if δm < 1
2
just as no collusion
with classical trigger strategies would be sustainable for δr < 1
2
.5
5Moreover, if collusive equilibria arise only in infinitely repeated games, the monopoly profit is reached here
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4 Discussion on Assumptions
This section briefly discusses the implications of our main assumptions of the model (A1-A3)
as well as the linear tariff contract the and the unit demand hypothesis.
4.1 Introducing a probability of exit (or entry)
A1 can be partially relaxed introducing a probability of exit for a manufacturer who has no
order in t = 1. Let denote this probability α. Analytical expression remain the same unless δi
is replaced by αδi, as exposed in the Appendix. Indeed, probability of presence for upstream
competition only affects profits for the future period, and thus plays the same role than the
discount factor. As α is reduced, the accommodation equilibria is less likely to happen given
δm, while the predation equilibrium is sustainable for a wider interval of δm.
A3 can be partially relaxed introducing a probability β of entry for a new inefficient pro-
ducer in t = 2. The two-period game equilibria are modified exactly as when we introduce a
probability of exit α with α = (1− β). On the contrary, the higher the probability of entry in
t = 2, the narrower (resp.wider) the interval of δm which sustains an accommodation equilibria
(resp. predation equilibrium).
4.2 Two-part tariff Contracts and Linear Demand
We now examine the robustness of our results to the introduction of two-part tariff: wholesale
prices may impact on quantities whereas fix part may be a tool of profit redistribution between
upstream firms and the retailer. In the unit demand framework, the wholesale price plays in
fact the role of unit transfer since the retailer may buy one unit to each manufacturer. The
wholesale price was thus just a tool for sharing profit and it did not impact so much on quantity
ordered.
for some high enough discount factor values, even if the number of periods is finite or known.
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In order to fully encompass quantities effect in firms' strategies, we introduce simple linear
demand framework Q = 1 − p, where we assume that each manufacturer needs a minimum
quantity of orders, q1i ≥ m in t = 1 to remain active in t = 2 (with m < 14). Demand becomes
now elastic and it is necessary to disentangle efficiency from profit sharing. However, note that
because M2 has to sell a minimum quantity m (inelastic demand), wholesale price and transfer
will be interrelated for this firm.
The following proposition shows that our main result still holds :
Proposition 2 (i)If δr ≥ 4cm
(1−c)2 , there are accommodation equilibria defined by: w
1A
1 = 0;T
1A
1 =
δr(1−c)2
4
− w1A2 m + (1−w
1A
2 )w
1A
2
2
and w1A2 ∈
[
0; δ
r(1−c)2
4m
]
;T 1A2 =
δr(1−c)2
4
− w1A2 m. R supplies from
the two suppliers in t = 1 and w2A1 = 0, T
2A
1 =
1
4
− (1−c)2
4
and w2A2 = c, T
2A
2 = 0.
(ii)When δr < 4cm
(1−c)2 , there is an exclusivity equilibrium where w
1E
1 = 0;T
1E
1 =
c
4
and w1E2 =
0;T 1E2 =
1
4
. R buys only from M1 in t = 1, and w2E1 = 0;T
2E
1 =
1
4
.
Proof. See Appendix.
With two-part tariffs, as long as the variable part is positive or null, each manufacturer is
in fact obliged to leave a rent to the retailer in order for the accommodation equilibrium to
hold (disagreement pay-off). However, the retailer makes less profits than in a one-shot game
repeated twice. If the retailer's discount factor is sufficiently low, there exists an exclusivity
agreement where the most efficient manufacturer (M1) supplies the retailer for both periods.
Note here that, contrary to the unit demand case, the discount factor do not have to be different
to insure that accommodation equilibria are sustainable. It is indeed the retailer's discount
factor, δr, that is relevant here because of retailer's financial constraint. Since underbidding on
wholesale price for getting exclusivity is not feasible for manufacturers (this would induce in
fact negative wholesale prices), the difference in the discount factors between manufacturers and
the retailer is no more a necessary condition for the existence of the accommodation strategy.6
6Note that with linear tariff contract, an accommodation strategy (pure Nash strategy) where wholesale
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5 Conclusion
This article shows in a simple two-period game that, if manufacturers are likely to exit the
market in case of insufficient orders in the first period, they may exploit this threat of exit to
capture the whole first period industry profit. Indeed, the retailer will accept to pay the high
price to the manufacturers in order to secure upstream competition in the second period. The
threat of exit appears here as a source of bargaining power for producers. Such a strategy is
however prejudicial for the social welfare since an inefficient supplier is artificially maintained
on the market for the sole reason of providing the retailer positive future profits. These results
are still valid with various assumptions on demand and contracts.
prices are set to leave no intertemporal rent to the retailer is never an equilibrium because a slight wholesale
price decrease from the most efficient seller is enough to convince the retailer to buy all to him, generating a
positive profit that results from the slight margin made on each unit. Remember that otherwise the retailer
would make no intertemporal profit on both periods. See the Appendix.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
• w1A1 + w1A2 = 2 + 2δr (1− c) is an equilibrium iff:
 M1 has no incentive to deviate: His profit with this accommodation strategy is
higher than the profit he would obtain in excluding M2, given w1A2 iff:
(2− w1A2 + 2δr (1− c)) + 2δmc > 2(w1A2 − 2δr (1− c)) + 2δm
⇔ w1A2 <
2
3
(1 + (3γ − 1) δm (1− c)) (1)
 M2 has no incentive to deviate: His profit with this accommodation strategy is
higher than the profit he would obtain in excluding M1, given w1A1 iff:
2− w1A1 + 2δr (1− c)− c > 2(w1A1 − 2δr (1− c)− c) + 2δm(1− c)
⇔ w1A1 <
2
3
(
1 +
c
2
+ (3γ − 1) δm (1− c)
)
(2)
(2) is rewritten with w1A1 = 2 + 2δ
r (1− c)− w1A2 , leading to (2'):
w1A2 >
1
3
(4 + 2δm (1− c)− c) (2′).
There is a continuum of equilibria such that w1A1 + w
1A
2 = 2 + 2δ
r (1− c), if w1A2 ∈[
1
3
(4 + 2δm (1− c)− c) , 2
3
(1 + (3γ − 1) δm (1− c))]. This interval is non empty if
and only if δm > δ˜ = 2−c
2(1−c)(3γ−2) .
• w1P1 = w12 − 2δr(1− c) and w1P2 = c is an exclusion equilibrium iff:
 M2 has no incentive to raise his price, which is immediate.
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 The resulting profit for M1 is higher with a exclusion strategy than with an accom-
modation one:
2(w12 − 2δr(1− c)) + 2δm > w12 + 2δr(1− c) + 2δmc⇔ w12 > (6γ − 2)δm(1− c)
As w12 > c, an exclusion equilibrium exist iff ⇔ δm < c2(3γ−1)(1−c) = δ∗.
Proof of Corollary 1
For accommodation equilibria to exist, we need to satisfy δr = γδ˜ < 1 which translates into
γ > 4(1−c)
4−5c . When c >
4
5
this condition is not binding since γ > 1 > 4(1−c)
4−5c .
Proof of Extensions
A1 and A3
There is a continuum of accommodation equilibria defined by the following conditions: w1A2 ∈[
1
3
(4 + 2δmα (1− c)− c) , 2
3
(1 + αδm (1− c) (3γ − 1))] and w1A1 +w1A2 = 2 + 2αδr(1− c) when
δm ∈
[
2−c
2α(1−c)(3γ−2) , 1
]
. There is one exclusion equilibrium, where w1E1 = c − 2δrα (1− c),
w1E2 = c when δ
m ∈
[
0, c
2α(1−c)(3γ−1)
]
.
Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, demand is linear and contracts between manufacturers and the retailer are
two-part tariffs. We also assume that each manufacturer needs a minimum quantity ordered to
survive (q1 > m and q2 > m with m <
1
4
). We solve the game backward.
• Second period
 If M1 is a monopoly, he offers a contract w21 = 0, T
2
1 =
1
4
to R.
Discounted payoffs are: piM1 =
δm
4
, piM2 = 0, piR = 0.
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 If M2 is a monopoly, he offers a contract w22 = c, T
2
1 =
(1−c)2
4
to R.
Discounted payoffs are: piM1 = 0, piM2 =
δm(1−c)2
4
, piR = 0.
 If M1 and M2 compete, M1 offers a contract w21 = 0, T
2
1 =
1
4
− (1−c)2
4
and M2 offers
a contract w22 = c, T
2
2 = 0 to R. Discounted payoffs are: piM1 = δ
m(1
4
− (1−c)2
4
), piM2 =
0, piR =
δr(1−c)2
4
.
• First period
We propose one candidate for the Nash equilibrium of 'accommodation' and we check
ex-post that there is no profitable deviation.
 Accommodation
Let first assume {w1A1 = 0;T 1A1 given}. The maximum fixed fee M2 can set in order
to induce an accommodation strategy is such that retailer's profit is higher if supplied
by the two manufacturers rather than just M1:
(p−w1A1 )(1−p−m)+(p−w1A2 )m−T 1A1 −T 1A2 +
δr(1− c)2
4
>
1
4
−T 1A1 ⇔ T 1A2 ≤
δr(1− c)2
4
−w1A2 m
M2's profit are therefore:
piAM2 = (w
1A
2 − c)m+ T 1A2 =
δr(1− c)2
4
−mc
The candidate equilibrium values for M2 are thus:
w1A2 ∈
[
0;
δr(1− c)2
4m
]
; T 1A2 =
δr(1− c)2
4
− w1A2 m > 0
Let assume {T 1A2 = δ
r(1−c)2
4
− w1A2 m;w1A2 given;w1A1 = 0}, the maximum fixed fee
M1 can set in order to induce an accommodation strategy is such that retailer's
profit is higher if supplied by the two manufacturers rather than just M2:
p(1−p−m)+(p−w1A2 )m−T 1A1 −T 1A2 +
δr(1− c)2
4
>
(
1 + w1A2
2
− w1A2
)(
1− 1 + w
1A
2
2
)
−T 1A2
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⇔ T 1A1 ≤
δr(1− c)2
4
− w1A2 m+
(1− w1A2 )w1A2
2
M1's profit are therefore: piAM1 = T
1A
1 + δ
m(1
4
− (1−c)2
4
).
The candidate equilibrium values for M1 are thus:
w1A1 = 0 ; T
1A
1 =
δr(1− c)2
4
− w1A2 m+
(1− w1A2 )w1A2
2
We check first that there are no incentives to deviate for either M1 or M2 towards
a different unit price.
- Does M1 would have an incentive to set a price w1A1 > 0 ?
piAM1 = w
1A
1
(1−2m−w1A1 )
2
+
(
(1−w1A1 )
2−(1−c)2
4
+ (w1A1 − c)m+ δr (1−c)
2
4
)
+ δm(1
4
− (1−c)2
4
)
∂piAM1
∂w1A1
=
−w1A1
2
< 0. There is no incentive to deviate for M1.
- Does M2 would have an incentive to set a price w1A2 6= c ?
piAM2 = (w
1A
2 − c)m− w1A2 m+ δr (1−c)
2
4
∂piAM2
∂w1A2
= 0. There is no incentive to deviate.
- Does M2 would have an incentive to set a price w12 = 0?
Retailer goes for accommodation as long as 1
4
− T 1A1 − T 1A2 + δr (1−c)
2
4
≥ 1
4
− T 1A1
⇔ T 1A2 ≤ δr (1−c)
2
4
With w1A2 = 0, pi
A
M2 = (0 − c)14 + δr (1−c)
2
4
while if w1A2 = c, pi
A
M2 = −cm + δr (1−c)
2
4
.
Since m < 1
4
, M2 has no incentive to deviate.
Finally, we have to check that each manufacturer does not have an incentive to
deviate towards an 'exclusion' strategy. To exclude his rival, a manufacturer has to
set a lower price than his rival such that the retailer may find it more profitable to
sign for exclusivity. Manufacturer M1 gets the exclusivity if the price w1E1 is such
that:
(p−w1E1 )(1−p−m)+(p−w1E2 )m−T 1E1 −T 1A2 +δr
(1− c)2
4
< (p−w1E1 )(1−p)−T 1E1
18
This leads to w1E1 < w
1A
2 +
1
m
(
T 1A2 − δr (1−c)
2
4
)
⇐⇒ w1E1 < 0. This is not possible.
Manufacturer M2 gets the exclusivity if the price w1E2 < 0 which is not possible.
None of the manufacturers has therefore an incentive to deviate. The equilibrium
found has however to provide positive profits to each agent. Payoffs are:
piAR =
(1−w1A2 )
2
4
− δr (1−c)2
4
+ w1A2 m
piAM1 =
(1−w1A2 )
2
4
− δr (1−c)2
4
+ w1A2 m+ δ
m
(
1
4
− (1−c)2
4
)
piAM2 = δ
r (1−c)2
4
− cm
In order to insure that piAM2 > 0, the following condition has to hold: δ
r > 4cm
(1−c)2 .
 Exclusivity
When δr < 4cm
(1−c)2 , M2 cannot prevent M1 from excluding him. Thus there is only
an exclusion equilibrium where M1 sets w1E1 = 0 and T
1E
1 =
c
4
− ε ; w1E2 = 0 and
T 1E2 =
1
4
leading M1 to get the exclusivity.
Additional Case: Linear Demand and Contracts
Let assume c < 1
2
, m < 1−c
6
and linear wholesale prices contracts between {M1,M2} and R, in
t = 2, the final retail price is p2 =
1+w2i
2
with i = {1, 2}.
• Second period If only M1 (resp.M2)is active, his profit is pi2M1 = δm 18 (resp. pi2M2 =
δm (1−c)
2
8
) and R's profit is pi2R = δ
r 1
16
(resp. pi2R = δ
r (1−c)2
16
).
If manufacturers compete, M2 has no profit and M1 gets pi2M1 = δ
m c(1−c)
2
, R gets
pi2R = δ
r (1−c)2
4
and q2M1 =
1−c
2
.
• First period There are two possible accommodation strategies for M2 given w11:
(1) M2 sets a strictly lower wholesale price than M1 : w21 < w
1
1. In such a case, the
retailer will buy the minimum order m to the most expensive supplier M1. The residual
demand addressed to M2 is therefore q1M2 = 1− p−m.
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The retailer maximizes pi1R = (p − w11)m + (p − w12)(1 − p − m) leading to p1 = 1+w
1
2
2
.
Therefore, M2 best response is given by w12(w
1
1) =
1+c
2
−m, i.e w12 such that pi1R(w12) = 0.
(2) M2 sets a strictly higher wholesale price than M1 : w21 > w
1
1. In such a case, the
retailer will buy him the minimum order m. The demand addressed to M2 is therefore
q1M2 = m.
The retailer maximizes pi1R = (p−w11)(1−p−m)+(p−w12)m leading to p1 = 1+w
1
1
2
. There-
fore, M2 best response is given by w12(w
1
1) =
1+w11(w
1
1+4m−2)
4m
, such that M2 maximization
his profits.
The same reasoning apply to find M1 best response, leading to w11(w
1
2) =
1
2
− m when
w11 < w
1
2 and w
1
1(w
1
2) =
1+w12(w
1
2+4m−2)
4m
when w11 > w
1
2.
There are two Nash equilibria "candidates" for accommodation:
(A): w1A2 =
1−2m+c
2
and w1A1 =
1−2m+c
2
+ (1+2m−c)
2
16m
where w1A1 > w
1A
2 and
(B): w1A1 =
1−2m
2
and w1A2 =
1−2m
2
+ (1+2m)
2
16m
where w1A2 > w
1A
1 .
However, a slight decrease in the wholesale price (for instance w˜11 =
1−2m
2
−  or w˜12 =
1−2m+c
2
−  ) is enough to convince the retailer to get exclusive supply from M1 (or M2)
because then not only piR > 0 but also the manufacturer makes an additional profit on
each unit sold.
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